The Summa of Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas volume 1
We will study here the terms relating to unity or plurality in God.
1. The very term trinity.
2. Can we say that the Son is “other” than the Father?
3. Can the exclusive term “alone”, which seems to deny the existence of another, be added to an essential name?
4. Can it be attached to a personal name?
Article 1 — Is there a trinity in God?
Objection:
1. Every name in God signifies substance or relation. Now the term “trinity” does not mean substance, because it would be attributed to each person. It does not mean the relationship either, because it is not constructed in the sentence as a relative term. We should therefore not use this term about God.
2 . “Trinity” appears as a collective noun, because it signifies a plurality. Now a name of this kind is not appropriate in God, the unity of the collective name being the least of the unities, whereas in God the supreme unity is verified. The term “trinity” is therefore not appropriate in God.
3. What is triune is threefold. But in God, there is no “triplicity”, because this is a kind of inequality. So, no trinity either.
4 . What is verified in God, is verified in the unity of the divine essence, since God is its essence. Therefore, if there is trinity in God, there will be trinity in the unity of the divine essence: which would make three essential unities. Which is heretical.
5 . It is a rule of divine names that the concrete is attributed to the abstract: the deity is God, the paternity is the Father. Now we cannot say: the trinity is triune. This would in fact make nine realities in God: another error. We should therefore not use this term in God.
On the contrary , S. Athanasius writes: “We must adore unity in the Trinity and the Trinity in unity. ”
Answer:
When it comes to God, the term “trinity” refers to the precise number of people. Therefore, just as we recognize a plurality of persons in God, there is reason to appeal to the word trinity; for what “plurality” means in general, the term “trinity” means precisely and determinately.
Solutions:
1. Etymologically, the word trinity seems to mean the unique essence of the three Persons, trinitas being put for triumunitas. But what it means strictly speaking is rather the number of persons of the single essence; therefore we cannot say: “the Father is the trinity”, because he is not the three persons. Furthermore, it does not mean relationships as such, but rather the number of people in relationship with each other, and that is why it is not grammatically constructed as a relative.
2 . In its meaning, the collective name implies two things: a plurality of agents, and a certain unity between them, which is the unity of an order. A people, for example, is a multitude of men subject to a certain order. So, if we stick to the first condition, “trinity” falls into the category of collective nouns. But it differs with regard to the second: in the divine trinity, there is not only unity of order, there is also unity of essence.
3 . “Trinity” is an absolute term which signifies the number three of the Persons. “Triplicity” means the proportion of three to one, that is to say a case of inequality, as we can learn from Boethius. There is therefore a trinity in God, but no triplicity.
4 . In the divine trinity, there is a number and the numbered people to consider. Therefore, when we say “the trinity in unity”, we do not introduce the number into the unity of the essence, as if it were three times one; we simply place the three persons in the one nature, as we say of the supposits of a nature that they subsist in that nature. Conversely, we say “unity in the trinity”, as we say that a nature exists in its agents.
5 . In trinitas est trina, the predicate means the multiplication of three by itself; because trina poses a tridistinction in the subject to which it is attributed. We cannot therefore say: trinitas est trina: it would follow that there are three supposits of the trinity, just as, if I say “God is trina”, it follows that there are three supposits of the deity.
Article 2 — Can we say that the Son is other than the Father?
Objections:
1 . “Other” is a relative term that evokes a diversity of substance. Therefore, if the Son is other than the Father, they will be diverse. However, according to S. Augustine, by saying “three persons”, we do not intend to evoke any diversity.
2 . Subjects that are other from each other differ in some way from each other. Therefore, if the Son is other than the Father, he is also “different”. But S. Ambrose opposes this: “The Father and the Son are one through their divinity; there is no difference of substance there, nor the slightest diversity. ”
3. Alienum, that is to say foreigner, derives from alius, that is to say other. But the Son is not “foreign” to the Father, because, says S. Hilaire, “between divine Persons there is nothing diverse, nothing foreign, nothing separable. ”Therefore neither is the Son other than the Father.
4. Alius, that is to say another, and aliud, that is to say something else, have the same meaning except the connoted gender, here neuter, there masculine. If therefore the Son is alius, that is to say other than the Father, it follows that he is also aliud, that is to say “something other than the Father.
On the contrary , we read in De fide ad Petrum: “One is the essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; in this essence, the Father is not one thing, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another, although personally the Father is another than the Son, etc. ”
Answer:
Inconsiderate formulas incur the reproach of heresy, says S. Jerome. Therefore, when we speak of the Trinity, we must proceed with caution and modesty: “Nowhere,” says St. Augustine, “is error more dangerous, research more laborious, discovery more fruitful. ” Now, in our statements concerning the Trinity, we have to guard ourselves against two opposing errors between which we must clear a safe path: the error of Arius who teaches, with the trinity of Persons, a trinity of substances; and that of Sabellius, who teaches, with the unity of essence, the unity of person.
To avoid Arius's error, we will avoid speaking of “diversity” or “difference” in God; this would ruin the gasoline unit. But we can appeal to the term “distinction”, because of the relative opposition; It is in this last sense that we will understand the expressions of “diversity” or “difference”, of people, if we encounter them in an authoritative text. Furthermore, to save the simplicity of the divine essence, we must avoid the terms “separation” and “division”; this is the division of the whole into its parts; to save equality, we will avoid the term “disparity”; to preserve similarity, we will avoid those of “foreign” and “divergent”. “In the Father and the Son,” says S. Ambrose, “the deity is one and without divergence. ” And according to S. Hilaire, there is nothing separable in God.
To rule out Sabellius' error on the other hand, we will avoid singularitas (solitude), which would deny the communicability of the divine essence: according to S. Hilaire, in fact, it is a sacrilege to call the Father and the Son “a solitary God”. We will also avoid the term “single”, which would deny the plurality of Persons; S. Hilaire thus says that “solitary”, “unique” are excluded from God. If we say “the only Son”, it is because there are not several Sons in God; but we do not say that God is “unique”, because the deity is common to several supposits. We still avoid the term “confused”, to respect the order of nature between the Persons. S. Ambrose says thus: “What is one is not confused; what is not differentiated cannot be multiple. ” We will also avoid the word “solitary”, to respect the society of People: “Neither solitary, nor diverse: this is how we must confess God”, says S. Hilaire.
Now, the masculine alius, that is to say another, evokes a pure distinction of supposits; we can therefore say without difficulty that the Son is alius a Patre, other than the Father, because he is indeed another suppositum of the divine nature, and likewise another person, another hypostasis.
Solutions:
1. “Another” alius is comparable to the terms which designate the individual: it is valid for the supposit (not for the essence). To verify its attribution, it is therefore sufficient that there be a distinction between hypostasis or person. On the contrary, for there to be “diversity”, there must be a distinction of second substance, that is to say of essence. This is why the Son is other than the Father, without them being different.
2. “Difference” implies distinction of form. Now, there is only one form in God: “He who existed in the form of God…”, says S. Paul. The term “different” therefore does not properly fit in God, as the alleged authority teaches. Damascene, it is true, uses this term in relation to God, because the relative property is expressed in the manner of a form; he says in fact that the hypostases do not differ from each other by their substance, but by their determined properties. Basically, as we said in the answer, “difference” comes here for “distinction”.
3 . Alienum means: foreign and dissimilar; but alius mentions nothing of the sort. This is why we say that the Son is alius, that is to say another than the Father, but not alienus, that is to say foreign to the Father.
4. Neutral is an indeterminate gender, masculine is a determined and distinct gender, as is feminine. The neutral is therefore suitable to signify the common essence; the masculine and the feminine, to signify a determined agent in common nature. So, when it comes to men, if we ask: Who is this? or Quis (masculine), we respond with a personal name: It's Socrates. But if we ask: What is it? or Quid (neutral), we answer: It is a reasonable and mortal animal. This is why, since in God there is a distinction of persons without distinction of essence, we say that the Father is alius (in the masculine), that is to say someone other than the Son, and not aliud (in the neuter ), that is to say something else. Conversely, we say that they are unum (neutral), that is to say one thing; and not unus (masculine), that is to say a single subject.
Article 3 — Can the exclusive term “alone” be added to an essential term?
Objection:
1. According to the Philosopher, he is alone who is not with another. But God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. We cannot therefore say that God is alone.
2. What can be added to an essential name, in God, can be attributed to each person or to all of them together. Thus we can say that the Father is wise God, that the Trinity is wise God, since God can be described as wise. Now S. Augustine stops at this thesis, that the Father is not the only true God. It is therefore that we cannot say “God alone”.
3 . If the word “only” is associated with an essential term, the exclusion targets either a personal predicate or an essential predicate. It does not aim at a personal predicate, because it is false to say: “God alone is Father”, since man is also. Nor does it aim at an essential predicate: in fact, if the proposition “God alone creates” were true, this would also be true, it seems: “the Father alone creates”; for what is true of God is also true of the Father. Now the last proposition is false, since the Son is also creator. It is therefore that the word “alone” cannot be added to an essential term, in God.
In the opposite sense : We read in the 1st epistle to Timothy (1,17): “To the immortal king of the ages, invisible, only God…”
Answer:
The word “alone” can be used in two ways: “ categorematic” or “syncategorematic”. We call “categorematic” the term which purely and simply posits in the subject the thing it signifies; this is the case of “white” in the expression: “the white man”. Taken thus, the word “alone” absolutely cannot be affixed to any term whatsoever in God; he would posit a solitude there, from which it would follow that God is solitary: and this has just been excluded.
We call “syncategorematic” the term which describes a relationship between predicate and subject, such as “all”, “null”, etc. ; this is also the case of the word “only”, which excludes any other subject from participation in the predicate. For example, when we say: “Socrates alone writes”, we do not mean that Socrates is solitary; we mean that no one writes with him, even if many are there with him. If we thus take the word “alone”, nothing prevents us from adding it to an essential term in God, to mean that all other beings are excluded from participation in the predicate. We can say for example: “God alone is eternal”, because nothing apart from God is eternal.
Solutions:
1. Certainly, the angels and the souls of the saints are always with God; and yet, if there were not several persons in God, necessarily God would be alone or solitary. Because the nature of a being which is foreign in nature to ours does not prevent our solitude; it is said of someone that he is alone in the garden, despite all the plants and animals that are there. In the same way we would say that God is alone or solitary, despite the angels and men who are with him, if there were not several persons in God. It is therefore not the society of angels and souls which draws God from his absolute solitude, even less from his relative solitude, that is to say from that which is verified for a particular attribute.
2 . If we want to speak properly, we do not use “alone” to modify the predicate: it is always taken formally. The word “alone” interests the subject, because it excludes any subject other than the one it accompanies. While the adverb “only”, also exclusive, is used both for the subject and for the predicate. We can in fact say: “Socrates only runs”; in other words, no one else is running. And it is also said: “Socrates only runs”; in other words, it does nothing else. Consequently, expressions like these: “the Father is the only God,” or “the Trinity is the only God,” are improper, unless they introduce some implication on the side of the predicate; for example, we want to say: “the Trinity is the one who alone is God”. S. Augustine who is alleged does not establish a thesis; he offers the explanation of a difficult text, he means that the invocation “to the invisible and only God” must be understood of the Trinity alone, and not of the person of the Father.
3. Whatever the predicate, essential or personal, “alone” can be added to an essential term posed as subject. Indeed, the proposition “God alone is Father” has two meanings: “Father” can attribute to the subject the person of the Father; then the proposition is true, since no man is this Person. “Father” can also only attribute the relationship of paternity: then the proposition is false, since such a relationship is verified in others (not unambiguously, of course). Likewise, it is very true that “only God creates.” If we cannot deduce: “therefore only the Father creates”, it is because, say logicians, the exclusive term “immobilizes” the term it accompanies; in other words, we cannot extend the proposition to particular supposits by returning from the general to the particular. From this proposition, for example: “Only man is an animal capable of laughing”, it does not follow that “only Socrates is an animal, etc. ”.
Article 4 — Can an exclusive term be added to a personal name?
Objections:
1. The Lord said to his Father (Jn 17:3): “Let them know you, the only true God. ” It is therefore that “the Father alone is true God”.
2 . We read in St. Matthew (11, 27): “No one knows the Son except the Father. ” In other words: only the Father knows the Son. And knowing the Son is common to the Three. So, same conclusion as above.
3 . The exclusive term does not exclude what is implied in the very notion of the term to which it is attached. It excludes, for example, neither the part nor the universal: from “Socrates alone is white”, we cannot conclude: “Therefore his hand is not white”, nor either: “Therefore the man is not white. ” Now a Person is involved in the notion of the other: the Father is involved in the notion of the Son, and vice versa. So by saying: “The Father alone is God”, we exclude neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit: this expression therefore appears true.
4 . Moreover, the Church sings: “You, the only Most High, Jesus Christ. ”
In the opposite sense , the proposition “the Father alone is God” is resolved into two others which explain it: “The Father is God” and “No one other than the Father is God. ” But the latter is false, because the Son, who is God, is another than the Father. Therefore the proposition “the Father alone is God” is false, as is any other of this kind.
Answer :
The proposition “the Father alone is God” can have several meanings. “Alone” can qualify the Father; and taken categorically, it makes the Father a solitary man; then the proposition is false. Taken syncategorematically, it still gives rise to several meanings: if “alone” excludes the others from the form of the subject “Father”, the proposition is true, because it then means: “He who is alone in being the Father, is God. ” This is the explanation given by S. Augustine, when he writes: “We say “the Father alone”, not that he is separated from the Son or the Holy Spirit, but by this we mean that they are not Father with him. ” However, this meaning is not the one that emerges from usual language unless it is implied, for example: “He who alone is called the Father is God. ”
In its proper sense, “alone” excludes the participation of the predicate; and this time, the proposition is false, if we want to say: to the exclusion of “another” (alius); it is true, if we only mean: to the exclusion of “something else” (aliud). Indeed, the Son is other than the Father, but not something else; likewise the Holy Spirit. But the word “alone” properly concerns the subject, we said: it therefore wants to exclude “another” rather than “something else”. Consequently, one should not generalize such an expression; when we encounter it in an authoritative text, we will be careful to explain it.
Solutions:
1 . The expression “You, the only true God” is understood not of the person of the Father, but of the whole Trinity, according to S. Augustine. If, moreover, we understand it from the person of the Father, we do not exclude the other Persons, because of the unity of essence; that is to say, then “alone” only excludes “something else”.
2 . Same response to the second difficulty: when we attribute an essential perfection to the Father, we exclude neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit, due to the unity of essence. Note also that it is not enough to answer that the Latin term nemo is equivalent to nullus homo, therefore that the exclusion only targets men; this is not the case, in the alleged text, because we would not have to make an exception of the Father. Nemo (person) is taken there in the usual sense, that is to say that it universally excludes any rational nature.
3 . The exclusive term does not exclude what is included in the very notion of the term to which it is attached and is only one subject with it: which is the case of the part and the universal. But the Father and the Son are two distinct supposits: the case is therefore not the same.
4. We do not say, without more, that “only the Son is the Most High”; we say that he alone is “the Most High with the Holy Spirit in the glory of God the Father.”