The Summa of Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas volume 1
1. In God, is the essence identical to the person?
2. Should we say that there are three Persons of one essence?
3. Are essential nouns assigned to Persons in the plural or in the singular?
4. Can adjectives, verbs or notional participles be attributed to essential nouns taken concretely?
5. Can they be attributed to essential names taken abstractly?
6. Can the names of Persons be attributed to concrete essential names?
7. Should essential attributes be appropriated from People?
8. What attribute should be appropriated for each Person?
Article 1 — In God, is the essence identical to the person?
Objection:
1. When the essence is identical to the person or supposit, there is only one supposit for a nature; we see it in all separated substances. For when two things are truly identical, one cannot multiply without the other also multiplying. Now, in God, there is one essence and three Persons, as we saw above. The essence is therefore not identical to the person.
2 . Yes and no are not verified simultaneously on the same subject. Now of the essence and the person we verify the yes and the no: the person is distinct and multiple, the essence is not. So person and essence are not identical.
3 . Nothing is subject of itself. Now the person is the subject of the essence: hence his name “suppôt” or “hypostasis”. The person is therefore not identical to the essence.
In the opposite sense , S. Augustine writes: “When we say: the person of the Father, we do not designate anything other than: the substance of the Father. ”
Answer:
As long as we consider the simplicity of God, the answer to our question does not leave the shadow of a doubt. We have shown it above, in fact: divine simplicity requires that in God essence and supposit be identical; a suppositum which, in intellectual substances, is nothing other than the person.
It seems that the difficulty comes, here, from the fact that the essence retains its unity despite the multiplication of persons. And since, according to Boethius, it is the relation which multiplies the persons in the Trinity, some have judged that the difference between person and essence in God comes from the fact that, according to them, the relations are adjoined (assistent) to the essence ; in relationships in fact, they only saw the aspect in which they are “towards the other”, forgetting that they are also realities.
But, as we have shown above: if, in created things, relationships have an accidental being, in God they are the divine essence itself. It follows that in God the essence is not really anything other than the person, although the persons are really distinguished from each other. Let us recall in fact that the Person designates the relationship as it subsists in the divine nature. Now the relation, compared to the essence, is not really distinguished from it, but only notionally; compared to the opposite relation, it is really distinguished from it by virtue of the relative opposition. This is how one essence and three Persons remain.
Solutions:
1. In creatures, the distinction of supposits cannot be ensured by relationships, essential principles are necessary; and this, because, in creatures, relations are not subsistent. But in God they are subsistent; they can also distinguish the supposits thanks to their mutual opposition. And yet the essence remains undivided, because, under the aspect in which they are truly identified with the essence, the relations themselves are not distinguishable from each other.
2 . As the essence and the person, even in God, present distinct intelligible aspects to us, we can affirm of one what we deny of the other; and consequently one can be the subject of a true attribution without the other being so.
3 . It was said above: we name divine things in the manner of created things. Now, the natures of the created world are individuated by matter, which is in fact a recipient subject of specific nature; hence it is that individuals take the names of subjects, supposits, hypostases. This is also why even divine persons receive these names of supposits or hypostases, although in their case there is no real distinction between the subject and that of which they are the subject.
Article 2 - Should we say that there are three Persons of a single essence?
Objections:
1. S. Hilaire says that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit “are three in substance, one in their harmony.” Now the substance of God is his essence. The three Persons are therefore not “of one essence.”
2. According to Dionysius, nothing should be affirmed about God that has not been authentically formulated by Holy Scripture. Now Sacred Scripture has never expressly said that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit “are of one essence”. So you shouldn't say it.
3 . The divine nature is the essence. It was therefore sufficient to say that the three Persons are of one nature.
4. It is not customary to relate the person to the essence, saying: “the person of such and such an essence”; but we rather relate the essence to the person, by saying: “the essence of such and such a person”. It therefore seems equally contrary to usage to say: “three Persons of one essence”.
5 . According to S. Augustine, we avoid saying that the three Persons are ex una essentia (“from a single essence”) for fear of giving the impression that in God the essence is something other than the person. But if the prepositions evoke a passage and a distinction, the same is true of the genitive case. It is therefore necessary, for the same reason, to refrain from the expression: tres personae sunt unius essentiae (of a single essence).
6. In speaking of God, we must avoid what can be an occasion for error. But our formula can be subject to error. S. Hilaire writes in fact: “To speak of “the unique substance of the Father and the Son” is to evoke either a subsistent which bears two names, or a substance which provided two imperfect substances, or a third prior substance which would have been taken and assumed by the other two. ” It is therefore not necessary to say that the three persons are “of one essence”.
In the opposite sense , “the word homoousion,” says S. Augustine, a word which was approved against the Arians at the Council of Nicaea, means that the three Persons are of a single essence.”
Answer:
As we said above, our intellect does not name divine things according to their own mode, for lack of being able to know them in this way; he names them according to the mode encountered in creatures. Now, in sensible things from which our intellect draws its knowledge, the nature of a given species is individuated by matter; nature thus plays the role of a form, and the individual that of subject or suppositum of the form. This is why even in God (this is our mode of signifying) the essence plays the role of a form of the three Persons. Now, when it comes to created things, our language relates all form to its subject: the form “of this one”. We thus speak of the health and beauty of “such a man”. But we only relate the subject who possesses it to the form if the form is accompanied by an adjective which determines it. We say thus: “this woman is of remarkable beauty”, “this man is of accomplished virtue”. Likewise, since in God there is multiplication of persons without multiplication of essence, we will say: “the unique essence of the three Persons”, taking these genitives as determinations of the form.
Solutions:
1 . In this text by S. Hilaire, “substance” is taken in the sense of hypostasis, and not of essence.
2. It is true that the expression “three Persons of one essence” is not found verbatim in Scripture. However, we clearly find what it means, for example in this passage (Jn 10:30): “My Father and I are one”; and in this other (Jn 10, 38; 14, 10): “I am in my Father, and my Father is in me. ” Many other passages could be cited.
3 . Nature designates the principle of action, but “essence” refers to being. Also, when we speak of things which have the same action in common, for example of everything which heats, we can say that they are of the same nature, but we can only say that they are of a single essence if it is their being that is one. Therefore, by saying that the three Persons have the same essence, we express divine unity better than by saying “the same nature”.
4. It is customary to relate to the subject the simple form: “the courage of Peter”. But we only relate the subject to the form if we want to determine its form; two genitives are then needed: one to signify the form, another to signify its determination. We will say thus: “Pierre has incomparable courage. ”Or else you need a genitive which is worth two; they say: “He is a man of blood,” that is to say, he sheds a lot of blood. Therefore, since we mean the divine essence as a form for the person, it is correct to say: “the essence of this person”; but the reverse is incorrect, unless we add a word determining the essence: “the Father is a Person of divine essence”, or: “the three Persons are a single essence”.
5 . The prepositions ex or de do not introduce a formal cause, but an efficient or material cause. Now these latter causes are always distinct from their effect; for nothing is its own matter, nor is anything its own active principle. On the contrary, a given thing can be its own form, as we see in all immaterial beings. Therefore, when we say: “tres Personae unius essentiae” (three Persons of a single essence), thus meaning the essence of a form, we do not present the essence as distinct from the person; on the contrary we would do it, if we said: “tres Personae ex eadem essentia” (three Persons coming from the same essence).
6 . S. Hilaire said: “We would do serious harm to sacred things if, under the pretext that some do not consider them sacred, we had to let them disappear. Do we misunderstand homoousion? It doesn't matter to me who hears it correctly. ” And above: “Let us say the substance “one” because the begotten receives the Father's own nature, but not because there would be sharing, union or communion” (to a prior substance).
Article 3 — Are essential nouns assigned to Persons in the plural or in the singular?
Objections:
1. Attributed to the three Persons, the essential names such as “God” must, it seems, be put in the plural and not in the singular. Just as the term “man” evokes a subject possessing humanity, so “God” evokes a subject possessing deity. Now the three Persons are three possessors of the deity. The three Persons are therefore three Gods.
2. When the Vulgate says: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” the Hebrew original bears Elohim, which can be translated “the gods” or “the judges”; and this plural aims at the plurality of Persons. The three Persons are therefore several gods, and not one God.
3 . The word res taken absolutely seems to belong to the genus substance. Now, attributed to Persons, it becomes plural; St. Augustine writes, for example: “The res we must enjoy are the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. ” We can therefore put the other essential nouns in the plural, when we attribute them to the three Persons.
4 . Just as the word God means: that which possesses deity, so the word person means: that which subsists in any intellectual nature. Now we say: “Three Persons”; we can similarly say: three gods.
On the contrary , it is written (Dt 6:4): “Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one God. ”
Answer:
Among the essential nouns, there are some which signify the essence in the form of nouns, others in the form of adjectives. The essential nouns attributed to the three Persons are in the singular, not the plural. While the adjectives attributed to the three Persons become plural. Here is the reason.
Nouns designate what they mean as a substance, while adjectives designate it as an accident, that is, as a form inherent to a subject. Now, substance has unity or plurality by itself, as it has being by itself; this is why the noun takes the singular or the plural depending on the form it signifies. While the accident, which has being in a subject, also receives from the subject its unity or its plurality; consequently, in adjectives, the singular or the plural takes supposits.
In creatures, it is true, we only encounter a unique form in several supposits in the case of a unity of order, like the form of an ordered multitude. In fact, the words which signify this type of form are attributed to several in the singular, if they are nouns, but not if they are adjectives. It is thus said that “several men make a college, an army, a people”; while we say: several men are “collegial”. In God, we said, we signify the divine essence as a form, which is simple and sovereignly one, as we showed above. Also, the nouns which signify the divine essence are put in the singular and not in the plural, when we attribute them to the three Persons. And this is why, of Socrates, Plato and Cicero, we say that they are three men, while of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit we do not say that they are “three gods” but “one God”. In three agents of human nature, there are in fact three humanities; but in the three Persons there is only one divine essence.
But the essential adjectives attributed to the three are put in the plural, because of the plurality of the supposits. We say that they are three existent, three wise, three eternal, uncreated, immense if we take these terms as adjectives. If we take them as nouns, we then say that the Three are one Uncreated, one Immense, one Eternal, as S. Athanasius says in the Symbol which bears his name.
Solutions:
1 . The word “God” does mean “having deity,” but with a different mode of meaning: “God” is a noun, while “having deity” is an adjective. Therefore, there are indeed “three having the deity (being God)” without there being “three gods”.
2. Each language has its own uses. Because of the plurality of supposits, we say in Greek: “three hypostases”; in Hebrew: “Elohim”, plural. We avoid the plural “Gods” or “Substances”, for fear of relating this plurality to substance or essence.
3. The word res is a transcendental. Taken in the sense of relationship, we put it in the plural in God; taken in the sense of substance, we put it in the singular. S. Augustine himself says, in the place cited: “This same Trinity is a certain supreme “reality”. ”
4 . The form signified by the word “person” is not essence or nature, but personality. And since in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit there are three personalities, that is to say three personal properties, the word “person” is attributed to the three not in the singular, but in the plural.
Article 4 — Can adjectives, verbs or notional participles be attributed to essential nouns taken concretely?
Objections:
1.This would be necessary for the proposition “God begets God” to be true; but that seems impossible. Indeed, according to logicians, what the singular term means and what it designates coincide. Now the word “God” seems to be a singular term, since we have said that it cannot be used in the plural. And since it signifies the essence, it therefore also designates the essence, and cannot designate the person.
2 . When the predicate restricts the designation of the subject, it is not by modifying its meaning, but only because of the tense connoted. Now when we say: “God creates”, “God” designates the essence. When we say: “God generates”, the notional predicate cannot therefore make the subject “God” designate the Person.
3 . If the proposition “God begets” is true, because the Father begets, it will be equally true that “God does not beget,” since the Son does not beget. There is therefore God who generates and God who does not generate; it seems to follow that there are two gods.
4 . If God begets God, this god that he begets is himself or another. But it does not generate itself: nothing, says S. Augustine, generates itself. Nor does he beget another God, for there is only one God. Therefore the proposition “God begets God” is false.
5 . If God begets God, this God that he begets is either God the Father or not. If it is God the Father, then God the Father is begotten. If it is not God the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father. But this is false. It is therefore that we cannot say: God generates God.
In the opposite sense , we say in the Creed: Deum de Deo “God of God”.
Answer:
Some have thought that the word “God” and others of the same kind designate the essence properly and by nature, but that the addition of a notional term leads them to designate the person. This opinion comes, it seems, from considering the requirements of divine simplicity; this wants that in God subject and form are identified: the possessor of the deity, or God, is identically the deity.
But to respect the property of expressions, it is not enough to consider the reality signified, it is also necessary to take into account the mode of signification. Now the term “God” signifies the divine essence in a substance, just as the term “man” signifies humanity in a substance. This other consideration led to a second opinion, which is preferable: the term “God” is capable, properly and by virtue of its mode of signification, of designating the person, like the term “man”.
Sometimes therefore the word “God” designates the essence, as for example in: “God creates”, where the predicate suits the subject because of the form signified: the deity. Sometimes it designates the person: either only one, for example in: “God begets”, or two: “God spires”, or all three together: “To the immortal king of the ages, invisible, only God, honor and glory (1 Tm 1, 17). "
Solutions:
1. The word “God” has in common with the particular terms that the form signified by it does not multiply; but it is related to the common terms, because the form signified is found in several supposits. it is therefore not necessary that it always designates the essence that it signifies
2. This objection is valid against those who thought (see the answer) that the word “God” can only be used to designate the person. artifice, not by virtue of its own and natural value
3. It is not in the same way that the word “God” and the word “man” are capable of designating the person. ”, that is to say humanity, being so divided into different supposits, this term designates the person, even without addition which determines it to designate a person who is a distinct supposit. Furthermore, the unity or. community of human nature does not exist in reality, but only in thought; the term “man” only designates common nature if the context requires it, for example if we say: “Man is a species. ” On the contrary, the form signified by the word “God”, that is to say the divine essence, is one and common in reality: this term therefore designates in itself the common nature, and if one wishes have him designate a person, this must be specified. Also, when we say: “God generates”, the word “God” designates the person of the Father, because of the notional act (proper to the Father), which is attributed to him. But when we say: “God does not generate”, nothing in the context specifies that it is a question of the person of the Son, and we give to understand that generation does not suit the divine nature. But if we add something, which refers the word “God” to the person of the Son, the formula will be true; for example: “God begotten does not beget. ” The conclusion deduced in the argument: “God is begetting and God is not begetting” therefore only holds if we refer in some way the word “God” to persons, if we say for example: “The Father is God and begets, and the Son is God and does not beget. ” But then it no longer follows that there are several gods, since the Father and the Son are only one God, as we have said.
4. The first branch of the dilemma: “the Father begets himself,” is obviously false; because the reflexive pronoun poses the same assumption as the subject to which it refers. Let no one oppose us with the words of S. Augustine: Deus Pater genuit alterum se. ” Because, either se is an ablative, giving the following meaning: “He generates someone other than himself”; or a simple reference is made, thus evoking an identity of nature, but then the expression is improper; or finally it is an emphatic expression which means: “... generates another itself”, that is to say “another completely similar to itself”.
The other part of the dilemma is also false: “He begets another God. ”For if it is true that the Son is “another than the Father”, we are not authorized to say that he is “another God”: here “other” acts as an adjective qualifying the noun “ God,” which means division of deity. Some theologians, however, concede the proposition: “He generates another God. ” They take “another” there for a noun to which “God” would be affixed, in other words: “...another who is God”. But this is then an improper way of speaking, and one that must be avoided so as not to give rise to error.
5. The first branch of this new dilemma, namely: “God generates a God who is God the Father”, is false: because “the Father”, placed in apposition to “God”, restricts this term to designate the person of the Father. The meaning is therefore: “God generates a God who is the Father in person”, that is to say that the Father would be generated: which is false. It is therefore the negative which is true: “God generates a God who is not God the Father. ” If, however, by adding a supposedly implied precision, we could not understand “God the Father” as an apposition, it would be the affirmative which would be true, and the negative false. We would then like to say: “He who is God, the Father, begat God. ” But this is a forced exegesis; it is better to purely deny the affirmative and concede the negative.
Prévostin, it is true, rejected both branches of the dilemma as false. Here is the reason he gives: in the affirmation, the relative “which” can simply evoke the supposit; but in negation, it evokes both form and supposit. The affirmative of our dilemma thus means that it befits the person of the Son to be God the Father; and the negative denies not only the person of the Son, but even his deity, to be God the Father. To tell the truth, this way of seeing does not seem to be based on reason: according to the Philosopher, what can be the object of affirmation can also be the object of negation.
Article 5 — Can notional terms be attributed to essential names taken abstractly?
Objections:
1.It seems that essential nouns expressed in abstract form can act as substitutes for the Person, and that for example the expression: “Essence generates essence” is true. S. Augustine writes in fact: “The Father and the Son are one wisdom, because they are one essence; and considered in their mutual distinction, they are wisdom of wisdom, as they are essence of essence. ”
2 . When we are generated or dissolved, there is generation or dissolution of what is in us. But the Son is begotten; and the divine essence is in him. So, it seems, the divine essence is generated.
3 . God is his divine essence, as has been shown. Now it has been said that the proposition “God begets God” is true. This is therefore also: “Essence generates essence. ”
4 . If an attribute can be said of a subject, it can be used to designate it. But the Father is the divine essence. Therefore the essence can designate the person of the Father: and thus the Essence generates.
5 . The essence is a begetting reality, because it is the Father, and he is the begetter. Therefore, if the essence does not generate, it will be a generating and non-generating reality: an impossible thing.
6 . S. Augustine says that the Father is the principle of all deity. But it is only a principle by generating or inspiring. So the Father generates or inspires the deity.
In the opposite sense : “Nothing generates itself,” says St. Augustine. Now, if essence generates essence, it generates itself, since there is nothing in God that is distinguished from the divine essence. So essence does not generate essence.
Answer :
On this point, Abbot Joachim fell into error; he asserted that, if we say: “God begets God,” we can just as easily say “Essence begets essence.” ” He considered, in fact, that due to divine simplicity, God is nothing other than the divine essence. In this he was mistaken; because to express oneself truthfully, it is not enough to consider the realities signified by the terms, it is also necessary to take into account their mode of signification, as we have said. Now, if it is indeed true that in reality “God is his deity”, it remains that the mode of meaning is not the same for these two terms. The term “God” signifies the divine essence in its subject; and this mode of signifying gives it a natural ability to designate the person. What is specific to persons can thus be attributed to the subject “God”, and we can say: “God is begotten or generates”, as we saw previously. But the term essence does not have, through its mode of meaning, any ability to designate the person, because it signifies essence as an abstract form. This is why the properties of persons, that is to say what distinguishes them from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence; because this would mean that there is a distinction in the essence as between the supposits.
Solutions:
1. To express the unity between essence and person, the holy Doctors sometimes forced their expressions beyond the limits required for the property of language. Such formulas are not to be generalized, but rather to be explained; that is to say, abstract terms will be explained by concrete terms, or even by personal names. Thus the formula “essence of essence” or “wisdom of wisdom” must be understood as follows: “The Son who is essence and wisdom, proceeds from the Father who is essence and wisdom. ” In these abstract terms, we can also note a certain order: those which relate to action have more affinity with people, since the acts belong to the agents. The expression: “nature of nature”, and this other: “wisdom of wisdom”, are therefore less improper than “essence of essence”.
2 . In creatures, the begotten does not receive the same nature, numerically identical, that the begetter possesses; he receives one, numerically distinct, which, through generation, begins to exist in him again, and ceases to exist through dissolution; thus nature is generated and corrupted by accident. But the begotten God possesses the same nature, numerically the same, as the begetter possesses; the divine nature is therefore not generated in the Son, neither by itself nor by accident.
3 . Certainly, “God” and “the divine essence” are all one in reality. However, due to the different meaning of each of these terms, we must speak differently about one and the other.
4 . The divine essence is attributed to the Father by identity, because of divine simplicity. It does not follow that it can designate the Father; This has to do with the way of meaning which is different from one term to another. The major part of the argument would be valid if it were a question of attributing a universal to its particular.
5. Between noun and adjective, there is this difference that nouns include in their very meaning the subject to which they relate, while adjectives relate what they mean to a subject noun. Hence this rule of logicians: nouns act as subjects, adjectives are attached to the subject. Personal nouns can therefore be attributed to the essence because of the real identity between essence and person, without at the same time personal property introducing its distinction into the essence; it applies to the supposit included in the noun. But notional and personal adjectives can only be attributed to the essence if they are accompanied by a noun. We cannot say: “Essence is engendering”; but we will say: “the essence is a generating reality, the essence of the generating God”, so that “reality” and “God” designate the Person. There is therefore no contradiction in saying: “Essence is a generating reality, and a non-generating reality”: in the first member, “reality” designates the person; in the second, gasoline.
6 . The deity, which is one in several supposits, has some affinity with the form signified by a collective noun. Thus, in the expression: “The Father is the principle of all deity”, “deity” can be understood for “all Persons”; and we want to say that, among all the divine Persons, it is the Father who is the principle. However, it is not necessary for him to be a principle of himself: thus someone is leader of the people, without being so of himself. We can also say that he is the principle of the whole deity, not because he generates it or inspires it, but because he communicates it by generating or inspiring it.
Article 6 — Can the names of Persons be attributed to concrete essential names?
Objection:
1. One cannot, it seems, attribute the Persons to concrete essential names, for example by saying: “God is the three Persons,” or “God is the Trinity.” Indeed, the proposition: “Man is every man” is false, because it is not verified by any of the supposits of the subject “man”: Socrates is not every man, neither is Plato, nor any other. Now it is the same with the proposition: “God is the Trinity”: it is not verified by any of the supposits of the divine nature. Indeed, the Father is not the Trinity; neither does the Son; and no more the Holy Spirit. Therefore the proposition: “God is the Trinity” is false.
2. In Porphyry's table [logical classification of beings], we do not attribute inferior terms to their superiors, except by accidental attribution, as when we say: “The animal is man”; it is, in fact, accidental for the animal as such to be man. Now, according to Damascene, the word “God” is to the three Persons as a superior term in relation to its inferiors. It seems that the names of Persons cannot be attributed to the subject “God”, except in an accidental sense.
On the contrary , a sermon attributed to S. Augustine declares: “We believe that the one God is a Trinity with a divine name. ”
Answer:
As we said in the previous article, while personal or notional adjectives cannot be attributed to the essence, nouns can because of the real identity between the essence and the person . Now, the divine essence is really identical to the three Persons, and not just to one of them. We can therefore also attribute to the essence one Person, or two, or three, and say for example: “the essence is the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit”. Furthermore, it has been said that the word “God” is itself capable of designating essence. And since the proposition: “The essence is the three Persons” is true, this must also be true: “God is the three Persons.” ”
Solutions:
1 . As said above, the term “man” itself designates the person, although the context may make it designate the common nature. The proposition: “man is every man” is therefore false, because it cannot be verified by any human suppositum. But the term “God” designates the essence of itself; and consequently, although the proposition “God is the Trinity” is not verified for any suppositum of divine nature, it is verified for the essence. It was for lack of considering this point of view that Gilbert de la Porrée denied this proposition.
2 . The proposition: “God or the divine essence is the Father”, is an attribution by identity, but it does not fit into the typical case of the attribution of a lower term to its higher universal; for in God there is neither universal nor particular. Therefore, since the proposition: “the Father is God” is true by itself, the reciprocal proposition: “God is the Father” is also true “by itself” and in no way “by accident”.
Article 7 — Should essential names be appropriated from Persons?
Objections:
1.When it comes to God, we must avoid everything that can cause error for the faith; S. Jerome said it well: insufficiently considered formulas lead to heresy. Now, appropriating to one Person what is common to all three can be an occasion of error for the faith; because we may think that this attribute only suits the Person to whom it is appropriated, or that it suits him more than others. We must therefore not appropriate essential attributes from People.
2 . Expressed in the abstract, the essential attributes are signified as forms. But the relationship of one person to another is not that of a form to his subject; form and subject do not make two supposits. We must therefore not appropriate essential attributes from People, especially when we express them in abstract form.
3 . The term proper logically precedes the term appropriate, because “proper” is used to define “appropriate.” But on the contrary, these are the essential attributes which precede persons in our way of thinking about God, just as the common notion precedes the proper notion. We should therefore not appropriate the essential attributes.
On the contrary , the Apostle said (1 Cor 1:24): “Christ, the strength of God and the wisdom of God. ”
Answer:
To manifest this mystery of faith, it was necessary to appropriate the essential attributes of the Persons. Indeed, if, as has been said, the Trinity of persons cannot be established by demonstration, it is nevertheless appropriate to illuminate the mystery by means more accessible to reason than the mystery itself. Now, the essential attributes are more within the reach of our reason than the personal properties, since, from the creatures, from which we draw all our knowledge, we can arrive with certainty at the knowledge of the essential attributes, not at all at that of the personal attributes. , as has been said. Just as we have recourse to the analogies of the vestige and the image, discovered in creatures, to manifest the divine Persons, so also we have recourse to the essential attributes. Manifesting People in this way by means of essential attributes is what we call appropriation.
Resorting to the essential attributes to manifest the divine Persons can be done in two ways. The first proceeds by way of resemblance: for example, to the Son who, as Word, proceeds intellectually, we appropriate the attributes concerning intelligence. The other proceeds by way of dissimilarity: we thus appropriate power to the Father, according to S. Augustine, because fathers, in this lower world, ordinarily suffer from the infirmities of old age, and we intend to remove any suspicion of such weaknesses in God.
Solutions:
1. When we appropriate essential attributes to Persons, we do not intend to declare them personal property; we only seek to manifest People by emphasizing analogies or differences. This therefore does not result in any error for faith, but rather a manifestation of the truth.
2 . Certainly, if we appropriated the essential attributes in such a way as to make them properties of Persons, it would follow that a person would perform the other formal office: S. Augustine rejected this error, showing that the Father is not wise about the wisdom he generates as if the Son alone were wisdom, as if the attribute “wise” did not suit the Father considered without the Son, but only the Father and the Son taken together. Truly, if the Son is called wisdom of the Father, it is because he is wisdom from the wisdom of the Father: each of them is wisdom in itself, and both together make one wisdom. The Father is therefore not wise by the wisdom he generates, but by the wisdom which is his essence.
3 . In the order of our thought, the essential attribute considered as such in fact precedes the Person; but nothing prevents that, considered appropriate, it presupposes personal property. Thus the notion of color presupposes that of extension, as such; and yet color is presupposed in nature to the white expanse, as white.
Article 8 — What attribute must be appropriated for each Person?
Objections:
1. It seems that the holy Doctors have attributed these essential attributes to the Persons in an unacceptable manner. For S. Hilaire says: “Eternity is in the Father, beauty in the Image, enjoyment in the Present. ” This formula evokes the Persons under the three proper names of “Father, Image” (proper name of the Son) and “Present”, that is to say “Gift” (proper name of the Holy Spirit, as we saw it previously). And it appropriates three attributes to them: to the Father, eternity; to the Son, beauty; to the Holy Spirit, enjoyment. This seems ill-founded. Indeed, eternity evokes the duration of being; species (beauty) is a principle of being; enjoyment depends on the operation. Now, where have we encountered the essence or the operation appropriate to a Person? The above appropriation is therefore not appropriate.
2. S. Augustine writes: “In the Father there is unity; in the Son, equality; in the Holy Spirit, the harmony of unity and equality. ” But that too is difficult. A Person cannot be formally qualified by what properly belongs to another; thus, we said above, the Father is not wise in the wisdom generated. But S. Augustine continues: “These Three are one, all three, because of the Father; equal all three, because of the Son; united all three, because of the Holy Spirit. ” It is therefore wrong that he appropriated these attributes to People.
3 . According to St. Augustine also, power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit. This appropriation does not seem very happy either; for strength belongs to power: now strength is found appropriated to the Son by S. Paul who speaks of “Christ, the strength of God”; even to the Holy Spirit by S. Luke (6,19): “A force,” he said, “came out of him, and healed them all. ”The power must therefore not be appropriated from the Father.
4 . S. Augustine also says: “We must not understand indiscriminately the formula of the Apostle: “Of him, and through him, and in him”; he says “of him” because of the Father; “by him” because of the Son; “in him” because of the Holy Spirit. ” Now this appropriation does not seem appropriate either; the expression “in him” seems to evoke the role of final cause, that is to say the first of causes; it should therefore be appropriate to the Father, who is the principle without principle.
5 . The truth is found appropriate to the Son, in St. John (14, 6): “I am the way, the truth and the life. “We also appropriate to the Son the “Book of life”; the Gloss thus explains this verse from Psalm 40:8: “At the head of the book it is written about me; that is to say in the Father, who is my head. ” To the Son again, we appropriate the divine name: “He who is”. For, on this word from Isaiah (65, 1 Vg): “I speak to the nations”, the Gloss notes: “It is the Son who speaks, he who said to Moses: “I am He who am. " ”
But it seems that these are properties of the Son, and not simple appropriations. Indeed, according to S. Augustine, “the Truth is the supreme similarity of the principle, without the slightest difference”; and it seems that this properly suits the Son, who has a principle. The “Book of life”, too, seems to be its own attribute, because it evokes a being which proceeds from another: every book has an author. Even the divine name “He who is” seems peculiar to the Son. Indeed, let us admit that it was the Trinity which said to Moses: “I am He who am”, Moses could then say to the Hebrews: “He who is Father, Son and Holy Spirit sends me to you. ”So he could go further and say the same thing by specifically pointing out one of the Persons. But he would have said something false, because no person is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Therefore, the divine name “He who is” cannot be common to the Trinity: it is an attribute specific to the Son.
Answer:
It is from creatures that our spirit moves to the knowledge of God; and to consider God, we must borrow the thought processes imposed on us by creatures. Now, when we consider any creature, four aspects are successively presented to us. First we consider the thing in itself and absolutely, as a certain being. Then we consider it as one. Then we consider its power to act and cause. Finally we consider its relationships with its effects. The same and fourfold consideration is therefore offered to us regarding God.
It is from the first of these considerations that which envisages God absolutely in his being that the appropriation of Hilary arises, where eternity is appropriated to the Father, beauty to the Son, enjoyment to the Holy Spirit. Indeed, eternity, insofar as it signifies being without beginning, offers an analogy with the property of the Father, principle without principle. Species or beauty, for its part, offers an analogy with the property of the Son. Because beauty requires three conditions. First of all, integrity or perfection: truncated things are therefore ugly. Then the desired proportions or harmony. Finally, brilliance: things that have brilliant colors are readily said to be beautiful.
Now, the first of these conditions offers an analogy with this property of the Son to truly and perfectly possess in himself the nature of the Father, in so far as he is Son. S. Augustine insinuates this when he says: “In him, that is to say in the Son, is the supreme and perfect life. ”
The second condition responds to this other property of the Son, of being the express image of the Father. We also see any portrait described as “beautiful” which perfectly represents the model, even if it is ugly. Augustine touches on this when he notes: “He, in whom is such a high resemblance and supreme equality…”
The third condition agrees with the third property of the Son, perfect Word, “light and splendor of intelligence”, as Damascene says. S. Augustine also touches on it when he says:
“As the perfect and flawless Word, art in a way of the almighty God…” Finally, usus (use) or enjoyment offers an analogy with the properties of Holy Spirit, provided we take usus in the broad sense, as the verb uti can understand frui in its specific cases; Saint Augustine thus says that uti (to use) is “to take something at one's free disposal,” and that frui (to enjoy) is “to use with joy.” ” Indeed, the “use” in which the Father and the Son enjoy each other is akin to this property of the Holy Spirit: Love. “This dilection,” writes S. Augustine, “this delight, this felicity or beatitude, Hilary gives it the name of usus. ” As for the “use” that we enjoy, it corresponds to this other property of the Holy Spirit: the Gift of God. “In the Trinity,” says St. Augustine, “the Holy Spirit is the sweetness of the Father and the Son, a sweetness which pours out in us and in creatures, with immense generosity and superabundance. ” And we therefore see why “eternity, beauty” and “enjoyment” are attributed to Persons, unlike the attributes “essence” and “operation”. Because these have too general a definition for us to be able to identify an aspect which offers analogies with the properties of Persons.
The second consideration affecting God is that of his unity. To this point of view relates the appropriation of St. Augustine, who attributes unity to the Father, equality to the Son, and harmony or union to the Holy Spirit. Each of these three aspects implies unity, but differently. Unity arises absolutely, without presupposing anything. Also it is appropriate to the Father, who does not presuppose any other person, being principle without principle. While equality means unity in the relationship with the other: we are equal to another, when we have the same dimension as him. So equality is appropriate to the Son, a principle derived from principle. Finally, the union evokes the unity of the two subjects. Also it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the first two Persons.
This explanation allows us to grasp the thought of St. Augustine, when he said: “The Three are one because of the Father, equal because of the Son, united because of the Holy Spirit. “It is indeed very clear that any predicate is specially attributed to the subject where it is first encountered; thus all living things, in this material world, are such because of the vegetative soul, with which life begins, for corporeal beings. Now unity belongs to the Father from the outset, even supposing the impossible exclusion of the two other Persons; these therefore derive their unity from the Father. But, if we ignore the other Persons, we will not find equality in the Father; this appears as soon as we place the Son. Also it is said that all are equal because of the Son; not because the Son is a principle of equality for the Father, but because the Father could not be described as “equal” if the Son were not equal to the Father. In this, equality appears first with regard to the Son; as for the Holy Spirit, if he is equal to the Father, he takes it from the Son. Likewise, if we abstract from the Holy Spirit, the link of the two, it becomes impossible to conceive of the unity of connection between the Father and the Son; so it is said that all are linked or “connected” because of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, as soon as we place the Holy Spirit, the reason appears which allows us to say of the Father and the Son that they are “related”.
The third consideration which envisages in God his efficient power gives rise to the third appropriation, that of the attributes of power, wisdom and goodness. This appropriation proceeds by way of analogy, if we consider what belongs to the divine Persons; by way of difference, if we consider what belongs to creatures. Power, in fact, evokes a principle. In this way she is akin to the heavenly Father, principle of all deity. On the contrary, it is sometimes lacking among the fathers of the earth, due to their old age. Wisdom is akin to the Son who is in heaven, because he is the Word, that is, the concept of wisdom. But it is sometimes lacking among the sons of this world, due to lack of experience. As for goodness, the motive and object of love, it is akin to the divine Spirit, which is Love. But it can be opposed to the earthly spirit, which involves a kind of impulsive violence: Isaiah (25, 4) thus speaks of “the spirit of the violent, like the hurricane that beats the wall”. That force is sometimes appropriated to the Son and the Holy Spirit is true, but not in the sense in which this word signifies power; it is in this particular use of the word where we call “virtue” or “strength” an effect of power, when we say that a work is very strong.
The fourth consideration considers God in relation to his effects. It is from this point of view that we appropriate the triad: “Of him, by him, in him. ” Indeed, the preposition “of” sometimes introduces the material cause but this has nothing to do with God; sometimes the efficient cause, which suits God because of his active power. We therefore appropriate it to the Father, like power. The preposition “by” sometimes designates an intermediate cause: the worker operates with his hammer. In this sense “through him” may be better than appropriate, it may be a property of the Son: “Through him all things were made,” says St. John. Not that the Son is an instrument; but it is the Principle resulting from the Principle. Sometimes “by” designates the formal cause by which the agent operates: the worker, it is said, operates through his art. In this sense, since wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, they are also appropriated “through him”. Finally, the preposition “en” evokes a container. Now, God contains things doubly: through his ideas first, because we say that things exist “in God”, in the sense that they exist in his thought; then the expression “in him” is appropriated to the Son. But God also contains things in the sense that his goodness preserves them and governs them by leading them to the end that suits them. Then “in him” is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, like goodness. Moreover, there is no reason to attribute to the Father, a principle without principle, the function of final cause, although it is the first of causes. Indeed, the Persons of whom the Father is the principle do not proceed with an end in mind: each of them is the ultimate end. Their procession is natural and seems to come more from natural power than from will.
As for the other appropriations which cause difficulty: the truth, first of all, since it concerns the intellect, as we have said, is indeed appropriated to the Son. It is not, however, its own attribute; for we can consider the truth either in thought or in reality; and since thought and reality (the latter understood in the essential sense) are essential and non-personal attributes, the same must be said of truth. Augustine's definition alleged above concerns truth as appropriate to the Son.
The expression “Book of life” evokes, in its direct term, knowledge; and in its genitive, life. This is in fact, as we have said, the knowledge that God has of those who will possess eternal life. It is therefore appropriated to the Son, although life is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, insofar as it involves a movement of interior origin and thus akin to this specific attribute of the Holy Spirit: Love. As for the condition of “written by another,” this does not belong to the book as a book, but as a work of art. The expression therefore does not imply an origin, and consequently is not a personal attribute: it is only appropriated to the person.
Finally, the divine name “who is” is appropriated to the person of the Son, not by virtue of its own meaning, but because of the context: that is to say insofar as the word addressed by God to Moses prefigured the liberation of the human race later accomplished by the Son. However, if we consider the relationship involved in this “who”, the divine name “who is” could be found related to the person of the Son. Then it would take on a personal meaning, for example if I say: “The Son is the “Who is” begotten, just as “God begets” is a personal name. But if the antecedent of “Who” remains undetermined, “Who is” is an essential attribute. ” It is also true that, in the sentence: Iste qui est Pater, etc., the pronoun iste (the one) seems to relate to a specific person; but grammar thus considers any thing designated as a finger to be a person, even if it is not a person in reality: This stone, this donkey. Also, still from the grammatical point of view, the divine essence signified and posed as subject by the word Deus can very well be designated by the pronoun ist, as in this text: Iste Deus meus et glorificabo eum (This is my God , I will glorify him).